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EXPERIMENTS WITH FIRMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Loyalty, Exit, and Enforcement: 
Evidence from a Kenya Dairy Cooperative†
By Lorenzo Casaburi and Rocco Macchiavello*
Organizations of all kinds depend on mem-
bers’ loyalty for their success, particularly when 
inevitable lapses drift the organization away 
from its production frontier. Hirschman (1970) 
famously argued that “loyalty” makes “exit” 
less likely and potentially gives more scope to 
“voice.” In limiting exit, loyalty becomes partic-
ularly important when it appears most irrational, 
i.e., when alternative are readily available.
Loyalty, therefore, is of paramount impor-
tance in the context of agricultural value chains, 
particularly so in developing countries: frequent 
shocks thwart organizations’ attempts to build 
and sustain relationships with farmers; readily 
available side-selling opportunities in informal 
markets enhance exit options; low levels of edu-
cation and mistrust lessen members’ faith in their 
ability to exercise voice in their organizations. 
These problems commonly surface in analysis 
of institutional arrangements as diverse as net-
work-based exchanges (see, e.g., Fafchamps 
2004); putting-out systems (e.g., Kranton and 
Swamy 2008), contract farming (e.g., Little 
and Watts 1994), and farmers’ cooperatives (e.g., Putterman 1989). To prevent inefficient 
“exit,” organizations try to impose institutional 
restrictions to exit, e.g., statutory regulations (“by-laws”) on members’  obligations. Yet, at 
least since Ostrom (1990) it has been known that 
a significant obstacle to the viability of cooper-
ative institutional forms has been the unwill-
ingness to enforce graduated sanctions against 
defecting members. How can loyalty be (re-)
built? And why is it difficult to enforce gradu-
ated sanctions?
I. Setup
We explore these questions in the context 
of a dairy cooperative (co-op) in Kenya.1 Like 
many others, the cooperative, one of the oldest 
in the country, has found itself facing increased 
competition for milk supply. Milk is produced 
by farmers twice a day: in the morning and in 
the afternoon. Administrative records from the 
co-op reveal that many members sell part of 
their milk to local traders; while they sell regu-
larly to the cooperative in the morning, they sell 
none of their afternoon production. Yet, selling 
to local traders is a violation of co-op’s by-laws: 
farmers are supposed to sell all their produce in 
excess of household consumption to the co-op.2
Following a deteriorating financial perfor-
mance, the management of the co-op has set out 
to explore ways of increasing milk deliveries 
and re-enhancing members’ loyalty. In February 
2014 the issue of afternoon milk deliveries was 
discussed at the general members’ assembly (henceforth, assembly). At the meeting, the 
by-laws provision according to which all milk 
1 These issues are particularly poignant among cooper-
atives: exit by a member imposes externalities on others, 
exposing the cooperative to “runs” and premature collapse 
(see Rey and Tirole 2000). 
2 Many traders are also illegal and operate without 
required license, posing a potentially serious hazard to 
consumers. 
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in excess of domestic consumption must be 
sold to the co-op was vigorously restated and 
the management announced that “graduated 
sanctions” as specified in the by-laws would be 
implemented. Those include financial penalties, 
refusal to purchase milk, and expulsion from the 
co-op. Following the meeting, a letter was also 
sent, mostly to members who did not deliver milk 
in the afternoon during the previous months. At 
that time, the co-op had 1,754 active members, 
among which 1,080 that did not deliver any milk 
during the previous month (henceforth, tar-
get members). In total, 529 members attended 
the assembly. Among the target members, 742 
received the letter and 361 attended the assem-
bly (263 did both).
II. Results
We explore how deliveries to the co-op 
changed after the assembly and the letter using 
detailed milk delivery data to the co-op and an 
original survey of noncompliant farmers con-
ducted after the assembly and the letter.
We implement a difference-in-differences (DID) specification that includes both day and 
farmer fixed effects and examine different mar-
gins of response. We focus on how members 
responded to the announcement that the co-op 
would implement penalties. We find three main 
results: (i) the announcement induced some 
members to increase deliveries; (ii) it also led 
other members to stop delivering milk (“exit”); (iii) the two components of the treatment—the 
assembly and the letter—are substitutes.
A. Positive Effects
We begin by considering an intention-to-treat (ITT) specification in which the focus is on 
target members (i.e., those not supplying milk 
in the afternoon session during January 2014), 
irrespective of whether they received the letter 
and/or attended the assembly. The announce-
ment generated a positive response among some 
of those target members. Figure 1 presents evi-
dence of this. The dark dots display the share 
of members delivering in the afternoon among 
the target members. Over the weeks immedi-
ately after the meeting, about 20 percent of 
these members start selling to the co-op. The 
light dots show the share of members selling 
in the afternoon among the remaining active 
members, i.e., those who sold at least once in 
the afternoon in January 2014. This likelihood 
is constant over the sample period. The differen-
tial response persists for several months after the 
announcement.3
Table 1 presents the DID specification. 
Column 1 focuses on daily deliveries and shows 
that average afternoon deliveries go up by 0.333 
liters in the target group. Column 2 aggregates 
the data in four 30-day periods (two before the 
announcement and two afterwards). It shows 
that the likelihood that the farmer sells to the 
co-op at least 15 days in the period goes up by 
17.1 percentage points among the target group 
after the announcement.
B. Exit versus Gaming
The results confirm that the announcement did 
induce some target members to sell to the co-op 
in both daily sessions. Column 3 in Table 1, how-
ever, shows a reduction in morning deliveries for 
targeted farmers, relative to nontargeted ones, 
albeit nonsignificant at conventional  levels. By 
3 The timing of the response rules out mean-reversion as 
an explanation for the delivery pattern. 
Figure 1. Share of Members Delivering Milk in the 
Afternoon
Notes: The dark scatter shows the daily share of “targeted” 
members delivering milk to the co-op in the afternoon. 
The light scatter shows the share of “nontargeted” mem-
bers delivering milk to the co-op in the afternoon. Targeted 
members are those who did not deliver milk in the afternoon 
in January 2014. The vertical line is placed at the general 
assembly date (February 11, 2014).
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combining the point estimates in column 1 and 
3, the announcement generated a small increase 
in daily deliveries (am + pm) among the target 
members, nonsignificant at conventional lev-
els. Column 4 provides evidence of a large and 
significant decline on the extensive margin: the 
likelihood of not delivering milk in the morning 
goes up by 7.8 percentage points, from a base-
line mean of 16.7.
This change may be driven by two different 
responses: “gaming” and “exit.” In the former, 
some members switch from delivering in the 
morning to delivering in the afternoon to avoid 
the penalties. In the latter, members stop deliver-
ing altogether, de facto leaving the organization. 
Column 5 suggests only moderate gaming: the 
likelihood that the target members deliver milk 
to the co-op only in the afternoon goes up differ-
entially by 1.4 percentage points relative to the 
nontarget members in the post period. The anal-
ysis when aggregating deliveries at the monthly 
level confirms this pattern (column 6). We find 
stronger evidence of “exit.” Column 7 shows 
that, following the announcement, the likelihood 
of no-delivery in any given day increases by 6.5 
percentage points for target members (relative to 
nontarget ones). In other words, “exit” explains 
83 percent of the decline in morning deliveries 
reported in column 4. The analysis of aggregate 
deliveries at the monthly level confirms these 
results: column 8 shows that the announcement 
increases significantly the share of target mem-
bers who deliver milk to the co-op less than 
15 days per month. This negative exit effect is 
permanent.
To summarize, the announcement of gradu-
ated sanctions against members not delivering in 
the afternoon had heterogeneous effects: some 
members positively responded, increasing deliv-
eries; others “exited” and reduced their morning 
deliveries.
C. Engagement
To better understand this heterogeneity, we 
explore differential effects within the group 
of targeted members. We are interested in 
understanding if the effect is larger for more 
engaged members (as implied by Hirschman’s 
argument) and whether the letter reinforces or 
dilutes the effects of members’ engagement. The 
announcement that sanctions would be enforced 
was delivered through (i) the assembly and, (ii) the letter. Here, we look at the impact and 
interaction of these two strategies. As caveats to 
a causal interpretation of the results, note that (i) the choice to attend the meeting may be cor-
related with other member-level unobservables 
and (ii) criteria the co-op used to select the letter 
recipients are not fully transparent.
We restrict the sample to target members 
and use a DID with farmer and day fixed 
effects as above. We split the target members 
into four groups and focus on afternoon deliv-
eries. Relative to those who did not attend the 
assembly and did not receive the letter, we find 
Table 1—Difference-in-Differences on Co-op Member Delivery Outcomes
Kg pm
>15 
days pm Kg am No am Only pm
>15 days 
only pm
No 
delivery
>15 days
no delivery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post × Target 0.333* 0.171*** −0.339 0.078*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.065*** 0.050***
(0.132) (0.017) (0.207) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013)
Dependent variable mean 2.440 0.356 7.505 0.167 0.016 0.010 0.151 0.121
Sample Daily Monthly Daily Daily Daily Monthly Daily Monthly
Observations 208,726 7,016 208,726 208,726 208,726 7,016 208,726 7,016
Notes: The table reports the coefficient  β from the following regression equation:  y it =  θ i +  θ t + β Pos t t × Targe t i +  ε it , 
where  y it is the outcome variable for farmer i in period t. The row Sample describes the frequency of the observations for each 
outcome variable (daily or monthly). A description of each outcome variable is provided in the text. The indicator Post equals 
1 if the observation refers to a period (day, month) after the cooperative general assembly (February 11, 2014). The indicator 
Target equals one if the co-op member did not deliver any milk in the afternoon in January 2014 and was thus targeted by the 
announcement at the meeting. Standard errors are clustered at the co-op member level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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that: (i) those who attended the assembly and 
did not receive the letter increase deliveries by 
0.64 kilograms (kg) (standard error = 0.21, 
p-value = 0.002) from a baseline mean of 
0.034; (ii) those who received the letter and 
did not attend the assembly increase afternoon 
deliveries by 0.23 kg (standard error = 0.097, 
p-value = 0.019); (iii) those who both attended 
and received the letter increased delivery by 0.29 
kg (standard error = 0.105, p-value = 0.005). 
In sum, the evidence confirms Hirschman’s 
logic that the effect of the announcement was 
stronger on more engaged farmers, i.e., those 
who attended the  assembly. Moreover, there is 
some evidence that the letter dilutes the effect 
among engaged farmers. Following a recent lit-
erature on pro-social behavior, we conjecture 
the letter crowded out the intrinsic motivation of 
more engaged members (see, e.g., Bénabou and 
Tirole 2006). The threat of sanctions is, never-
theless effective on less engaged farmers.
III. Why Is It Difficult to Enforce Threats?
It turns out that the cooperative never enforced 
the threatened sanctions on nondelivering mem-
bers. As famously illustrated by Ostrom (1990), 
our cooperative is far from being unique in this 
respect. Why is it so difficult to enforce threats, 
even when they are written in formal by-laws?
Some suggestive evidence comes from a sur-
vey we conducted among farmers a few months 
after the assembly and the letters were sent. We 
focus on farmers that were still not complying 
with the by-laws. We argue that a key challenge 
in enforcing threats comes from heterogeneous 
beliefs among members on the legitimacy of 
those threats. This evidence echoes recent work 
on the importance of clarity in managing and 
sustaining relational contracts (see Gibbons and 
Henderson 2013).
Among those farmers who did not respond to 
the threat of sanctions, we asked, “Do you think 
the co-op should take actions against members 
that hawk milk?” We find that 64 percent of 
respondents say that co-op should not punish 
members who hawk.4 Among those who say 
the co-op should punish, 46 percent say the 
co-op should fine these members; 41 percent 
4 Reasons given are that members should be free to sell 
their milk and that the co-op pays prices lower than traders. 
the co-op should expel members; 30 percent the 
co-op should refuse to buy milk (all these sanc-
tions are part of the by-laws).
These differences in beliefs are likely to 
reflect differences in attitudes towards the co-op 
management rather than differences in informa-
tion. Farmers stating the co-op should not act 
against defecting members do not appear to be 
less informed about provisions in the by-laws 
and are equally likely to report to have read 
them.5 Perhaps more tellingly, farmers against 
sanctions (i) report lower levels of trust in the 
co-op board members (but not in other co-op 
members, nor in generic trust); (ii) are signifi-
cantly more negative in eight out of ten ques-
tions about co-op management.6 They also are 
more likely to report that a bonus would be more 
effective at increasing deliveries from members 
than the penalties stated in the by-laws.
IV. Conclusions
Studying a cooperative’s attempt to increase 
deliveries by members, we have shown what 
the threat of sanctions leads to highly heteroge-
neous response among members. While some 
members “exit,” other members increase their 
deliveries. Despite the cooperative not actually 
enforcing the threatened sanctions, we find posi-
tive effects that persist for several months.7
5 We asked six true/false questions to assess farmers’ 
knowledge of the co-op’s by-laws. Farmers against sanc-
tions are more likely to answer they do not know the answer 
to the question. However, conditional on answering, there 
is no difference in response. Note that in four out of the six 
questions, respondents are essentially equally split between 
“true” and “false.” In the two questions in which respondents 
are not split, the majority of respondents got the answer 
wrong in one of the two questions. Being not able to respond 
is hardly a sign of less information in this case. 
6 The questions are adapted from standard workplace sat-
isfaction questionnaires: 1. Co-op management is competent 
in doing its job; 2. I am satisfied with services provided by 
the co-op; 3. Co-op has communicated effectively strategy, 
rules and procedures; 4. Milk collector is fair to me; 5. It is 
very important that all members attend the general annual 
meeting; 6. Co-op management shows enough interest in the 
needs of their members; 7. Services provided by the co-op 
are distributed equitably among members; 8. I feel a sense 
of pride in selling milk to the co-op and being a member; 
9. Small members are adequately represented. 10. Co-op is 
financially sustainable. Tellingly, only 4 and 5 are not differ-
ent across the two groups. 
7 The persistent positive effects likely arise from changes 
in members’ perceptions of the co-op engagement and 
attempts to improve while the negative ones arise from 
MAY 2015290 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
Surveying noncompliant members, we dis-
cuss suggestive evidence for why organizations 
might fail to enforce threats and apply sanctions 
that would benefit members as a whole: hetero-
geneity in beliefs about the legitimacy of those 
sanctions. This highlights the crucial role played 
by managers in sustaining relational contracts. 
In particular, it echoes recent developments in 
the relational contract literature about the role 
of clarity in defining what parties are supposed 
to do and how they are supposed to react to 
 defections. An important role of managers, then, 
is to communicate to members the sources of 
value generated by the organization. In compan-
ion research (Casaburi and Macchiavello 2014), 
we show that one key source of value created 
by the co-op is the ability to credibly promise 
deferred payments to members and explore the 
implications for market structure and co-op 
strategy of the resulting interlinkages.
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